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SHARED INTENTION IS NOT 
JOINT COMMITMENT
Matthew Kopec and Seumas Miller
argaret Gilbert has long defended the view that, roughly speaking, 
agents share the intention to perform an action if and only if they 
jointly commit to performing that action.1 This view has proven both 
influential and controversial. While some authors have raised concerns over the 
joint commitment view of shared intention, including at times offering purport-
ed counterexamples to certain aspects of the view, straightforward counterex-
amples to the view as a whole have yet to appear in the literature.2 Here we pro-
vide such counterexamples to show that joint commitment is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for shared intention.
Before presenting the counterexamples, we must explain Gilbert’s joint com-
mitment view of shared intention. As she states:
Members of some population share an intention to do A if and only if they 
are jointly committed to intend as a body to do A.3
The key notion here is that of joint commitment.4 As Bratman points out, Gil-
bert sees joint commitment as a somewhat basic notion, and it would therefore 
1 Gilbert, Joint Commitment, “Shared Intention and Personal Intentions,” Sociality and Re-
sponsibility, “Walking Together,” and “What Is It for Us to Intend?”
2 For general critiques of the joint commitment view of shared intention, see, e.g., Bratman, 
Shared Agency, ch. 5; Ludwig, From Individual to Plural Agency, 261–71; and Miller, review 
of Joint Commitment. For purported counterexamples, see, e.g., Bratman, “Shared Intention,” 
110–11; Faces of Intention, 132–33; “Dynamics of Sociality,” 7; “Modest Sociality and the Dis-
tinctiveness of Intention,” 152–53; and Shared Agency, 112, 116. Also see Ludwig, From Indi-
vidual to Plural Agency, 266–68. We later discuss how Gilbert has some reasonable routes 
to reply to some of these kinds of examples that she lacks with our counterexamples. We 
thank an anonymous referee for leads to some of these examples, which we had missed in 
an earlier draft.
3 Gilbert, “Shared Intention and Personal Intentions,” 179.
4 What it could mean to “intend as a body” also calls out for further explanation, but we skip 
this in the interest of space, since it will not matter to the counterexamples we present. See 
Gilbert (Joint Commitment, 115–17) for discussion of this aspect of joint commitment. 
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be pointless to attempt to give a full and proper definition of the concept.5 But 
Gilbert does give her readers some guidance to fix upon the notion. For example, 
she states, “Intuitively an appropriate agreement between the parties is sufficient 
to bring a shared intention into being.”6 It follows from the biconditional above 
that an appropriate agreement between the parties will also be sufficient to bring 
about a joint commitment. What makes an agreement appropriate? She states 
that “each of two or more people must openly express his personal readiness 
jointly with the others to commit them all in a certain way . . . Once the concor-
dant expressions of all have occurred and are common knowledge between the 
parties, the joint commitment is in place.”7 This suggests that Gilbert holds the 
following:
Agreement: If all relevant parties openly agree to perform a collective ac-
tion A by expressing their readiness to each other to commit to acting in 
the relevant ways, then the parties are jointly committed to doing A.8
Thus, the right kind of agreement is a sufficient condition for a joint commit-
ment on Gilbert’s account. 
Gilbert offers some further guidance on the notion of joint commitment by 
giving what are, and are not, some necessary conditions for a joint commitment 
to obtain. We start with the latter. Gilbert accepts what she calls the “disjunction 
criterion,” which states that, “when two or more people share an intention, none 
of them need have a personal contributory intention.”9 She supports this claim 
with her classic example of Ned and Olive, who agree to walk together to the top 
of a hill.10 Gilbert argues that even if both of them change their minds along the 
way, thus losing their personal intentions to summit the hill, the pair can contin-
ue to have the shared intention to summit the hill. Since, according to Gilbert, 
individual personal intentions to perform the action are not a necessary condi-
tion for them to hold a shared intention, Gilbert’s biconditional above further 
entails that such personal intentions are not necessary for a joint commitment. 
Thus, she holds the following: 
Disjunction: A group can be jointly committed to perform the collective 
5 Bratman, Shared Agency, 113–14.
6 Gilbert, “Shared Intention and Personal Intentions,” 169.
7 Gilbert, “Shared Intention and Personal Intentions,” 180.
8 To be fully comprehensive, a common knowledge condition must also be added here, but 
this will not be relevant to anything that follows, so we pass over it in the interest of space.
9 Gilbert, “Shared Intention and Personal Intentions,” 171.
10 Gilbert, “Shared Intention and Personal Intentions,” 171–72.
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action A even though no members of the group personally intend to act 
in order to ensure that A obtains.
As far as what is necessary for a joint commitment to obtain, Gilbert focuses 
on the obligations that are always carried with joint commitments. She states 
that “an adequate account of shared intention will entail that each party to a 
shared intention is obligated to each to act as appropriate to the shared inten-
tion in conjunction with the rest.”11 Gilbert argues that her joint commitment 
account of shared intention meets this criterion, by presenting cases in which a 
joint commitment to do some act is in place, yet one of the members fails to do 
her part in performing the action. Given that it seems fully justified for the other 
parties to the joint commitment to rebuke the bad actor, this suggests that joint 
commitments give rise to the relevant obligations. But it is crucial to Gilbert’s 
view that the kind of obligation involved is not of the moral or institutional vari-
ety.12 This suggests that Gilbert accepts the following:
Rebuke: A group is jointly committed to perform a collective action A only 
if members of the group are justifiably subject to (non-moral, non-insti-
tutional) rebuke for failing to do their part in performing the action.
Thus, the appropriateness of rebuke (of a certain sort) upon failing to do one’s 
part is a necessary condition for joint commitment.
So, while Gilbert does not provide her reader with a full definition of joint 
commitment, she does give enough details to fix upon what she intends by the 
phrase. We now show that shared intention is not joint commitment.
1. Joint Commitment Is Not Sufficient for Shared Intention
In this section, we show that joint commitment is not sufficient for shared inten-
tion. We proceed by simply giving a counterexample. Take the following case:
Saboteurs: A government during wartime asks for volunteers to build a 
strategically important bridge. Unbeknownst to the government, every 
eventual volunteer in the group turns out to be a conscientious objector; 
each privately intends to thwart the government’s efforts to win the war 
whenever possible. That said, every member publicly assents to the goal 
of building the bridge as a team, agreeing to each other that they each 
will do their part. Moreover, their outward behavior looks as though the 
team is working as a well-functioning body. But each privately intends to 
11 Gilbert, “Shared Intention and Personal Intentions,” 171.
12 See Miller, review of Joint Commitment.
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merely act as though she is helping to build the bridge. Each occasionally 
commits various blunders, losing a crucial piece of equipment here, in-
correctly mixing some concrete there, etc. The result is that the bridge is 
never completed. 
Now, suppose the government liaison, i.e., the official overseeing how the proj-
ect is going, realizes what is going on.13 If her irate superior officer calls for an 
explanation of the bridge’s delay, we could imagine her retorting, “The team of 
volunteers you sent me don’t really share any intention to build this bridge.” We 
find it obvious that what the project leader says here is true. The dissidents do 
not share the intention to build the bridge; rather they each personally have the 
intention to merely seem like they are building the bridge.14
While it is clear that the group of conscientious objectors lacks a shared in-
tention to build the bridge, Gilbert would be forced to say they do have a joint 
commitment to build the bridge. Recall that Gilbert accepts Agreement, and 
the volunteers in this case have publicly expressed their readiness to each other 
to commit to acting in the relevant ways so that they build the bridge together. 
Since such an agreement is sufficient for a joint commitment on Gilbert’s ac-
count, Gilbert must say that the volunteers are jointly committed to building 
the bridge. And since the builders are jointly committed to building the bridge, 
but obviously do not share the intention to build the bridge, it follows that joint 
commitment cannot be a sufficient condition for shared intention.
Gilbert might object that, in the Saboteurs case, publicly assenting to the goal 
of building the bridge together is not enough to constitute a joint commitment, 
perhaps because an individual cannot jointly commit to a goal unless she has 
some intention to actually attain the goal. Unfortunately, this line is not open to 
Gilbert, since she accepts Disjunction. Recall that, on her account, one cannot 
determine whether a group has a joint commitment by examining whether the 
13 We are assuming that the government liaison is not one of the volunteers. 
14 An anonymous referee has pressed us to explain the difference between our example and 
one presented by Bratman (Shared Agency, 112, 116) involving a pair who insincerely prom-
ise to plow the commons together. First, Bratman does not intend his case as a general coun-
terexample to Gilbert’s view that shared intention is joint commitment. Rather, he uses it 
to argue that potential joint actors can have obligations to act jointly without sharing the 
intention to act jointly. As he puts it, “Since we have each promised—albeit insincerely—
we each have a moral obligation to the other to plow” (112). Second, in our case there is no 
promising, and thus, we would argue, no corresponding moral obligations. Thus, Gilbert 
has a response to Bratman’s case that she lacks with ours. Since the kinds of obligations at 
issue in joint commitment are not moral obligations, she could simply claim that his case is 
one in which moral obligations are present but a joint commitment is not. We will not take a 
stand on whether such a response is plausible. We thank an anonymous referee for pressing 
us here.
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agents have a personal intention to perform the action. While Gilbert seems to 
think that Disjunction is a positive feature of her view, Saboteurs shows that in fact 
this requirement introduces a flaw.
But there might be a more nuanced way for Gilbert to press this kind of ob-
jection. In the Ned and Olive case, which Gilbert uses to support Disjunction, 
both Ned and Olive do initially intend to climb the hill, even though their per-
sonal intentions fade at some point during the climb. Gilbert explains that when 
she says the members must be personally ready to commit to acting she means 
to imply “that each is indeed personally ready for this, and that he expresses 
this readiness.”15 Perhaps when Gilbert talks of an individual being “personally 
ready” to commit, she means that the individual must, at the point of expressing 
the commitment, actually have a personal intention to perform the relevant acts. 
Since the conscientious objectors in the Saboteurs case do not intend to build 
the bridge from the very start, Gilbert might be able to use this move to claim 
that there cannot have been a genuine joint commitment. And if there was not a 
genuine joint commitment, that case cannot serve as a counterexample.
There are two ways to reply to this nuanced version of the objection. The first 
reply would be to slightly modify the Saboteurs case. We could stipulate that the 
volunteers really did intend to build the bridge at the outset, but later found out 
that their government had embarked on an unjust war, and only at this later time 
became conscientious objectors and commenced to sabotage the project. We 
still feel it would be obviously true when the liaison reports, “The team of volun-
teers you sent me don’t really share any intention to build this bridge.” A second 
reply would point out that the revised objection carries a heavy cost for Gilbert. 
What is distinctive about Gilbert’s view is that she is able to give an account of 
shared intention that is not held captive to personal intentions, which she sees 
as a benefit for her view over the views of her competitors. On the revision, her 
account of shared intention is held captive to personal intentions, although only 
at the point when the joint commitment is made. This move, while it might help 
get some of the intuitions right, seems to us to be otherwise unmotivated. It is 
hard to see why personal intentions could be so very important in setting up the 
shared intention and yet so very unimportant in maintaining it. This suggests to 
us that views like those of Bratman and Miller, which link shared intentions to 
personal intentions for the duration, are preferable to Gilbert’s under this revised 
reading.16
15 Gilbert, Joint Commitment, 115.
16 Bratman, “Shared Intention” and Shared Agency; Miller, “Joint Action” and Social Action.
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2. Joint Commitment Is Not Necessary for Shared Intention
In this section, we show that joint commitment is not necessary for shared in-
tention. Before we present a counterexample, we need to make a few preliminary 
remarks. All of the players in the debate over the nature of shared intention agree 
that shared intention is a precondition of joint action.17 For example, Gilbert’s 
own account of shared intention was drawn up in order to account for joint ac-
tions like walking together.18 So, it is safe to assume that every joint action will 
be accompanied by a shared intention.
To see why joint commitment cannot be a necessary condition, consider the 
following case:
Shopping Spree: Two strangers walk into a grocery store and are imme-
diately stopped by the manager who has randomly chosen them for a 
store promotion. She states that if the two of them can retrieve all the 
ingredients for an ice cream sundae and deliver them to checkout number 
five within twenty seconds of a starting buzzer, they will each receive a 
five-hundred-dollar store gift certificate. She explains that the necessary 
ingredients are crushed peanuts, maraschino cherries, whipped cream, 
and vanilla ice cream, and she then points out large signs marking the 
aisles where those items are located. Since the cherries and peanuts are 
on one side of the store and the ice cream and whipped cream are on the 
other, and given the very short time to complete the task, it is instantly 
clear to each contestant that they will only be able to complete the task 
if they each sprint to separate sides of the store to grab those respective 
items. Before they can discuss any plans, the buzzer sounds, and they 
each start off to the side of the store they are closest to, quickly looking 
back to check to make sure the other is doing the same. They successfully 
return all four items.
Now, clearly these two strangers have successfully completed the joint action 
17 See, e.g., Bratman, “Shared Intention” and Shared Agency; Miller, “Joint Action” and “Inten-
tions, Ends and Joint Action”; Tuomela, Social Ontology; Tuomela and Miller, “We-Inten-
tions.” At least, every player in the debate that we are aware of accepts this. To be clear, the 
phrase “joint action” is used as a term of art in the literature, to be distinguished from mere 
“collective action.” For example, two agents walking together is a joint action, while 380 mil-
lion Americans creating 4.8 billion metric tons of CO2 in a year is a mere collective action. 
Nobody believes the latter entails the existence of a shared intention, for obvious reasons. 
Shared intention is really what makes joint action distinct.
18 See Gilbert, “Walking Together,” “What Is It for Us to Intend?” and “Shared Intention and 
Personal Intentions.”
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of delivering the four necessary ingredients to checkout number five within the 
time limit. And, as we suggested earlier, the fact that this was a joint action en-
tails that the pair had the shared intention to perform the action in question. 
So, these two strangers each shared the intention to deliver the four necessary 
ingredients to checkout number five within the time limit.19
But do the shoppers have a joint commitment to perform the action in ques-
tion? Because Gilbert accepts Rebuke, they have such a commitment only if they 
each justifiably could rebuke the other for failing to do their part. But this kind 
of susceptibility to rebuke seems entirely missing in this case. For example, the 
strangers did not have time to make any commitments to each other. As soon as 
the starting buzzer rang, they did not stop to publicly assent to each other their 
goals of doing thus and so. And, being complete strangers, they could not have 
any standing commitments to acting cooperatively in cases like this. Thus, if one 
of the shoppers initially started off for the sundae items but then abandoned her 
plan to participate and simply moved along to collecting the items on her usual 
shopping list, the other shopper would not have any real standing to rebuke her 
for not helping to complete the task. Since neither participant in this case has 
19 An anonymous referee has pressed us to explain the difference between our example and 
some presented by Bratman. In a number of places, Bratman uses cases in an attempt to 
establish that shared intentions need not generate obligations, e.g., (1) his “Ayn Rand” sing-
ers who explicitly waive their obligations (“Shared Intention,” 111; Faces of Intention, 133; 
“Modest Sociality and the Distinctiveness of Intention,” 151; see also Ludwig, From Individ-
ual to Plural Agency, 267–68); (2) people coerced into agreeing to perform joint actions 
(Faces of Intention, 132–33; “Modest Sociality and the Distinctiveness of Intention,” 152); 
(3) those who share the intention to perform immoral joint actions (“Modest Sociality and 
the Distinctiveness of Intention,” 152); and (4) cases of casual joint actions like sponta-
neously applauding a performance (“Dynamics of Sociality,” 7; “Modest Sociality and the 
Distinctiveness of Intention,” 151; see also Ludwig, From Individual to Plural Agency, 266–
68). First, as with note 14, above, these examples are not intended as general counterexam-
ples to Gilbert’s view but are rather used for the narrower purpose of showing that shared 
intentions do not always generate obligations. And although we employ a closely related 
strategy here, our example is not subject to Gilbert’s readily available replies to these oth-
er examples. Contra (1)–(3), Gilbert could plausibly claim that while the agents in those 
cases lack all-things-considered obligations to perform the joint actions, due to extenuating 
circumstances like side agreements or moral considerations, they can nonetheless have pro 
tanto obligations grounded in their agreements (cf. Gilbert, Joint Commitment, 112–13). And 
Gilbert could plausibly argue that the kinds of casual joint actions offered by Bratman and 
Ludwig in (4) are not genuine instances of joint intentional action. For example, she could 
plausibly claim that applauding together is more akin to eating a pile of crawfish together 
than it is to singing a duet together. And most of Ludwig’s examples intuitively lack per-
sistent obligations to act, simply because those examples lack success conditions. But Gil-
bert’s likely moves to dispute these cases will not work against our example. We thank an 
anonymous referee for pressing us here. 
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any obligation to do their part to complete the joint action, Gilbert would have 
to accept that they do not have any joint commitment to complete the action 
in this case. It follows that joint commitment cannot be necessary for shared 
intention. 
Gilbert might object that in this case there actually is a joint commitment 
between the strangers by simply denying that the two shoppers lack the obliga-
tion to do their part to complete the task. That is, she could claim that, if one of 
the shoppers were to run off to start her usual shopping as opposed to working 
to complete the joint action, then the other shopper would indeed be justified 
in rebuking her. While it is difficult to argue with someone who simply does not 
share our intuitions, we think it is possible to account for such intuitions while 
still denying that the shoppers have a joint commitment to perform the action. 
The first response would be to point out that on Gilbert’s account the rebuke 
must be not only understandable, but also justified. While the one shopper who 
does his part might feel a bit irritated that the other decided not to participate, 
this does not entail that his rebuke would be justified. For example, if the shop-
pers were enemies as opposed to merely strangers, it becomes a bit more clear 
that the two do not have any obligation to ensure that a good result is bestowed 
upon the other. If she does not want the gift certificate herself, nothing binds her 
to participating. After all, she never agreed to participate.
But a second reply would point out that, as often happens in cases of joint 
action, various other moral concerns can enter the picture and cloud one’s intu-
ition. If it seems intuitively plausible that rebuke would be justified in the case of 
one failing to do one’s part, this might be because the reader takes the shopper to 
have a standing obligation to improve the welfare of others if the cost to herself 
is trivial.20 We could probe whether this factor is what is generating the intuition 
by changing the case so that the “prize” is something that is unlikely to enhance 
either stranger’s welfare, such as that each will be congratulated over the loud-
speaker, or some such. In such a case, it should become obvious that a rebuke of 
the shopper who declines to participate would be completely unjustified. So, if 
the reader finds it intuitively plausible that each shopper in the original case does 
have an obligation to do their part, this intuition traces back to a moral norm, 
as opposed to a norm generated directly from a joint commitment.21 Therefore, 
this kind of response on the part of Gilbert is a nonstarter. 
20 Similarly, one might think that falsely encouraging someone else to rely on one’s behavior 
when something morally significant is at stake might be morally wrong (cf. Scanlon, “Prom-
ises and Practices”), and five hundred dollars’ worth of groceries could certainly be morally 
significant. But, as we point out, moral obligations are dialectically irrelevant here.
21 We could say a similar kind of thing with regard to practical normativity. The one shopper’s 
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3. Conclusion
In this essay, we have shown that joint commitment is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for shared intention. What went wrong? We suggest that in Gilbert’s 
attempt to sever the tie between shared intention and personal intention, which 
is what her notion of joint commitment is supposed to do, she lost contact with 
what shared intention truly is. Our counterexamples suggest, somewhat indi-
rectly, that shared intentions and personal intentions are closely tied together. 
In Saboteurs, the group lacks the shared intention to build the bridge because 
none of them really has the personal intention to help build the bridge. In Shop-
ping Spree, the group has the shared intention to deliver the relevant items to 
the checkout lane in time because each has the personal intention to do their 
part to complete that joint action (along with meeting other conditions that will 
not concern us here). This all suggests that accounts of shared intention that are 
closely tied to personal intentions, such as Bratman’s or Miller’s, are preferable 
to Gilbert’s joint commitment account.22
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irritation would be more explicable if we assume that the other shopper actually values 
the gift certificate than it would be if we assume that she does not value it. This suggests 
that another way we can make sense of the shopper’s irritation is by noting that the other 
shopper is acting irrationally, i.e., she is not effectively pursuing her own interests. But notice 
that this kind of rebuke is not based on what the one shopper owes the other shopper, but 
rather what she owes herself. That will not be the kind of rebuke Gilbert needs. We thank an 
anonymous referee on this point. 
22 Bratman, “Shared Cooperative Activity,” “Shared Intention,” and Shared Agency; Miller, 
“Joint Action” and Social Action. 
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